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AN EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETIC OF HAVELOCK ELLIS
BY ARNOLD GINGRICH
IN WORDS that have become, through promiscuous blurb use,
widely known, Mencken has termed Havelock Ellis "the most
civilized Englishman living today." The appellation is a happy one,
for it is with civilization, or conscious fine-living, that Ellis has all
his life been chiefly concerned. In characterizing Hutcheson as "an
open-minded eclectic who insisted that life itself is the great matter,"
he made a phrase which applies, with equal aptness, to himself.
Havelock Ellis has been, throughout a career remarkable for its
success in widely diversified special fields, most of all a connoisseur
of those things which tend to raise and ennoble the life of man. His
aim has been the achievement of a practical vision of the world as
beauty, a harmonious arrangement of life under the conditions of
our day, and the one instrument he has deemed adequate to the at-
tainment of this goal is the method of art. That living is or may
be an art, and that the method of the artist is essential to the really
successful life, is the fundamental thesis underlying Ellis' entire
body of work. Years ago, in the New Spirit, he gave his first expres-
sion to this thesis in a passage which is essentially in tune with
his latest, and definitive, formulation of this idea:
It is by art and religion that men have always sought rest. Art
is a world of man's own making, in which he finds harmonious de-
velopment, a development that satisfies because framed to the meas-
uring-rod of his most delicate senses. Religion is the anodyne cup
—
indeed of our own blood—at which we slake our thirst when our
hearts are torn by personal misery, or weary and distracted by life's
heat and restless hurry. At times, the great motor instincts of our
nature, impelling us by a force that we cannot measure or control,
cause us to break up our dainty house of art. or to dash down
bravely the cup of healing. Rut we shall always return to them
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again ; they, too, represent an instinct at the root of our being-. In
the recognition of this harmony lies the secret of all wise living.
. . . For art is nothing less than the world as we ourselves make
it, the world remolded nearer to the heart's desire. In the construc-
tion of a world around us, in harmonious response to all our senses,
we have at once a healthful exercise for our motor activities, and
the restful satisfaction of our sensory needs. Art, as no mere hyper-
aesthesia to external impressions, or exclusive absorption in a single
sense, but as a many-sided and active delight in the wholeness of
things, is the great restorer of health and rest to the energies dis-
tracted by our turbulent modern movements. Thus understood, it
has the firmest of scientific foundations : it is but the reasonable
satisfaction of the instinctive cravings of the organism.
To the student of orthodox, or formal, aesthetics certain of the
above phrases come as a distinct shock. Considerations of art as a
"restorer of health," as a "reasonable satisfaction" with the "firmest
of scientific foundations" are apt to fall strangely upon ears accus-
tomed to the aesthetician's hymns to the autonomy of beauty and
the disinterested freedom of the art experience. But looking fur-
ther into his work we shall find that the "art" of his discourses upon
fine-living is not necessarily the "art" of his aesthetic discussions,
and although he considers art and aesthetics "fundamentally the
same," he makes very important distinctions between the artistic
attitude and the aesthetic attitude, between the creative and the con-
templative. Thus it will be profitable, in fact, necessary, to pick our
way carefully through the main body of his work, and in the pas-
sages dealing with art attempt to settle, if possible, the sense in
which the word is used.
We find that the word "art" refers now to the objects of aes-
thetic contemplation, to the "special arts," and again to the synthetic
art which these "special arts" subserve, the whole "art of living."
For although Hav clock Ellis is perhaps the most readable of all
modern "serious" writers, even the clarity of his very excellent style
is not always of sufficient efficacy to obviate the reader's wish that
these "arts" could be distinguished as "art" and "art-prime." At
the same time, separating this art that is the art-of-living base from
the art that is "just art," will be rewarded by the possession of two
sets of art dicta, the juxtaposition of which will give us the presen-
tation, on the one hand, of certain essential aspects of the art-of-
living thesis, and on the other, at least a partial statement of Ellis'
ideas in the realm of aesthetics as such.
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Thus, abandoning for a time continuity, let us look among his
different books for discussions of art which may tend to make more
clear the exact meaning of portions of the later "aesthetics of
action." as opposed to aesthetics of contemplation.
.\11 literary art lies in the arrangement of life.
. . . There is no connection between coarseness and art.
Is not a certain aloofness essential to our vision of the Heaven
of Art ?
In a certain sense there is more in the tremulously faint and far
reflection of a thing than there is in the thing itself. The dog who
preferred the reflection of his bone in the water to the bone itself,
though from a practical point of view he made a lamentable mis-
take, was aesthetically justified \loofness is essential to the
Fieatific Vision. If we entered its portals. Heaven would no longer
be Heaven.
. . . That perpetual slight novelty in which lies the secret of
life, as well as of art.
... A certain outward idleness, a semi-idleness, as Nietzsche
said, is the necessary condition for a real religious life, for a real
aesthetic life, for any life on the spiritual plane.
All the art of living lies in a fine mingling of letting go and hold-
ing on.
Every artist writes his own autobiography. Even Shakespeare's
work contains a life of himself for those who know how to read it.
In its chief but rarer aspect literature is the medium of art, and
a's such can raise no ethical problems. Whatever morality or im-
morality ar: may hold is quiescent, or lifted into an atmosphere of
radiant immortality where questioning is irrelevant.
It may be observed that the atmosphere into which genius leads
us, and indeed all art. is the atmosphere of the world of dreams.
Dreaming is . . . one of our roads into the infinite. And it is
interesting to notice how we obtain it—by limitation.
All the matters that enter into courtship tend to fall under the
sway of art ; their aesthetic pleasure is a secondary reflection of their
primary vital joy.
He [Lao Tze] recognized that ceremony is subordinate in the
scheme of life, as colour is in a picture, the picture being the real
thing.
For the si)here in which ceremonies act is Man's external life;
his internal life is the sphere of Music.
Some of the items of this melange are obvious enough almost to
require apology for inclusion, being recognizable counters of in-
numerable aesthetic discussions ; others, seemingly slight and insig-
nificant observations, are important in conjunction with the author's
later expressions. In the Dance of Life, the latest and, probably,
the definitive, presentation of Ellis' outlook on the world, he has
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set Up the dance as the model on which to pattern our lives. "For
dancing is the loftiest, the most moving, the most beautiful of the
arts, because it is no mere translation or abstraction from life ; it is
life itself." Now as an aesthetic deliberation on the dance as an
art-form, this jars ; it is out of tune with previous statements of the
relation of ?rt and life. What art, indeed, has Ellis found to be a
mere translation or abstraction from life? Then, too, one senses
here the beginning of a difificulty. Granting the idea he is propound-
ing, that "life is a dance," it may seem sheer dunderheadedness to
object that the equation is not operative both ways, that "a dance is
life" is not equally tenable. And yet, in Ellis' casuistic system this
objection may prove, where successions of such dicta are related,
a real difificulty. To return, then, life is a dance, our discipline is
the strenuous discipline of the dancer, our method of living the
method of the dancer who selects from among the possible motions
that present themselves as confused, disordered possibilities, only
those which blend beautifully in a perfect harmony, in a rhythm
best in accord with the fundamental rhythm of the body itself.
Here, too, the aesthetic pleasure may be a secondary reflection of
the primary vital joy, but the matter tends to fall under the sway
of art. This ruling of life by the spirit and method of art. Ellis
holds to be the natural manifestation of a fundamental elan, or, to
check up on the earlier statement of The New Spirit, an "instinct at
the root of our being." And art in turn is simply the most vital
expression of that impulse, though the impulse is contained in other
aspects of man's life. To quote :
Religion, or the desire for the salvation of our souls. Art, or
the desire for beautification. Science, or the search for the reason
of things—these conations of the mind, which are really three
aspects of the same profound impulse, have been allowed to furrow
each its own narrow separate channel, in alienation from the others,
and so thev have all been impeded in their greater function of fer-
tilizing life.
All these various elements of life are but. as it were, allotropic
forms of the same element. The most fundamental among these
forms is that of art, for life in all its forms, even morality in the
narrowest sense, is, as Duprat has argued, a matter of technique,
and technique at once brings us to the elements of art.
Within the small scope of these two paragraphs there has already
occurred opportunity for some confusion simply in the use of the
word "art." First it is used in the sense in which we most often
think of it, as the desire for beautification, as such. Later, "tech-
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niqiie brings us to the elements of art." Here, does not the word
have more nearly the meaning of making, or practice ? In addition,
there is tht suggestion that it has, whatever it is, been impeded by
alienation from religion and science in its greater function of the
fertilization of life. In one case, to fall back upon a phrase used
elsewhere in the book, "we are concerned only with the primary
stuff of art, the bare simple technique of the human dance," and in
the other we are discussing two aspects of art as we are acquainted
with it. Later on in the book, this statement throws some light on
the meaning toward which the word is tending in its use as repre-
sentative of the ideal synthesis of the "profound impulses"
:
Herbert Spencer pointed out. in his early essay on The Genesis
of Science, that science arose out of art, and that even yet the dis-
tinction is "purely conventional," for "it is impossible to say when
art ends and science begins." Spencer was here using "art" in the
fundament?! sense according to which all practice is in the nature
of art.
Again
:
Dr. Charles Singer . . . now defines science, no longer as a body
of orofanized knowledge, but as "the process which makes knowl-
edge," as "knowledge in the making" : that is to say, "the growing
edge between the known and the unknown." As soon as we thus
regard it. as a making process, it becomes one with art.
We see now that this new casuistry is acquiring a vocabulary all
its own, lending new meanings to old words, though not always con-
stant meanings, and occasionally the old meanings come into view.
As a matter of fact, much of our acceptance or rejection of Ellis'
system depends upon our willingness to accept it as a word-struc-
ture. For an integral part of Ellis' system is found in the fact thai
its growth has been characterized, if, indeed, not accomplished, by
a continual slight inconsistency in the matter of things we should
have expected to consider, as being axiomatic, unchanging. To this
we shall be obliged again to have recourse. As an example of the
extent to which word-building on foundations at once relative and,
somehow, mutable, is wrapped up in the process of seeing life as an
art, we may look at this development of "morals," with its attend-
ant seeming-tangle on "discipline"
:
We are, indeed, simply concerned with a discipline or routine
which in this field is properly described as "custom," and the word
"morals" essentially means "custom." That is what morals must
always be for the mass, and, indeed, to some extent for all, a dis-
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cipline, and, as we have already seen, a discipline cannot properly
be regarded as a science or an art.
Yet, . . . there is still some interest in the question of morals.
For, after all, there is the small body of individuals ahead, alertly
eager to find the road, with a sensitive flair for all the possibilities
the future may hold. When the compact majority, blind and auto-
matic and unconscious, follows after, to tramp along the road these
pioneers have discovered, it may seem but a dull road. But before
they reached it that road was interesting, even passionately inter-
esting.
The reason is that, for those who, in any age, are thus situated,
life is not merely a discipline. It is, or may become, really an art.
But again
:
For the artist life is always a discipline, and no discipline can
be without pain, etc.
Finally
:
Insofar as we can infuse it with the spirit and method of art,
we have transformed morality into something beyond morality ; it
has become the embodiment of the dance of life.
Stickling for literalness, we might refuse to go on until made
certain whether "morals" is an art or a discipline, or both, or if one,
how not the other; on the other hand, we must remember that the
Dance of Life is a book written by one who holds that thinking, too,
is fundamentally an art and an art-process. In art "the continual
slight inconsistency" is not, really, inconsistent. Ellis, as he himself
both intends and realizes, stands "on Philosophy's threshold"—and
in the Age of Relativity. Too, he owes much of his method to
Hans Vaihinger, the philosopher of the fictional, of the "Als Oh,"
to whom thinking is a regulated error—which applies, very aptly, to
art. And by his own standards and indeed by those of the age, his
method is, for its purpose, justified. "The diversity of the Many
is balanced by the stability of the One. That is why life must always
be a dance, for that is what a dance is: perpetual slightly varied
movements which are yet always held true to the shape of the
whole." Thus, at least, until we have envisioned the whole of which
these fragments of his thought are but evolutionary parts, we must,
even though grumblingly, go on.
Thus we must pursue still further the art-quality which Ellis
sees at the base of man's related central impulses, and the regulation
of these impulses by the spirit and method of art, which he con-
siders essential to the achievement, in the dance of life, of a civiliza-
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tion in beauty. At the risk, and indeed it is the desire, of disap-
pearing entirely from' the picture, I shall let the words be his own,
for after all the thesis is his, and is best presented by him ; only the
contemplation and the criticism should be mine. First of all, either
the subordination, or the inclusion, of thinking, or, as the "search
for the reasons of things," science, to this larger synthetic "art,"
must be accounted for:
The world is an unrelated mass of impressions, as it first strikes
our infant senses, falling at random on the sensory mechanism, and
all appearing as it were on the same plane. For an infant the moon
is no farthei away than his mother's breast, even though he possesses
an inherited mental apparatus fitted to coordinate and distinguish
the two. It is only when we begin to think, that we can arrange
these unrelated impressions into intelligible groups, and thinking is
thus of the nature of art.
We have arrived again at Vaihinger, who points out, as Ellis
quotes
:
"Even when we walk, it is only by a series of regulated errors,
a perpetual succession of falls to one side and the other side." Our
whole progress through life is of the same nature : all thinking is a
regulated error. For we cannot, as Vaihinger insists, choose our
errors at random or in accordance with what happens to please us
;
such fictions are only too likely to turn into deadening dogmas : the
old z^s dormitiva is the type of them, mere husks that are of no vital
use and help us not at all. There are good fictions and bad fictions
just as there are good poets and bad poets. It is in the choice and
regulation of our errors, in our readiness to accept ever-closer
approximations to the unattainable reality, that we think rightly and
live rightly. We triumph insofar as we succeed in that regulation.
"A lost battle," Foch, quoting De Alaistre, lays down in his Principes
de Guerre, "is a battle one thinks one has lost" ; the battle is won by
the fiction that is won. It is so also in the battle of life, in the whole
art of living. Freud regards dreaming as fiction that helps us to
sleep ; thinking we may regard as fiction that helps us to live. Man
lives by imagination.
Imagination is thus a constitutive part of all thinking. We may
make distinctions between practical scientific thinking and disinter-
ested aesthetic thinking. Yet all thinking is finally a comparison.
Scientific fictions are parallel with aesthetic fictions. The poet is
the type of all thinker? : there is no sharp boundary between the
region of poetry and the region of science. Both alike are not ends
in themselves, but means to higher ends.
"Not ends in themselves, but means to higher ends" ; that is
not the statement of an aesthetician, but of an aesthetic moralist.
Poetry is a special art, which subserves the higher end of "fine liv-
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ing:," itself an art. But as for the preceding- portion, is it "ever-
closer approximations to the unattainable reality" that we seek in
art? This is, it is true, in harmony with Ellis' earlier and aestheti-
cally not incontrovertible statement that the picture is the real thing,
but it is not in harmony with the statement that aloofness is essential
to the beatific vision, nor that the atmosphere into which all art leads
us is the atmosphere of the world of dreams. Perhaps there is in
his mind the Platonic ideal good, or the thing-in-itself of Schopen-
hauer, but that is traveling from the psychological field into the
metaphysical, which Ellis has professed to avoid. The solution
suggests itself that, whereas he considers art and aesthetics funda-
mentally the same, he does not feel the same about the new synthetic
art of which the very stuff and fibre is life itself. At any rate,
the field of what this new art may be, and still remain an art, or
Art, is narrowing.
Referring to this power of fiction on human action, he draws
this conclusion from the consideration of the two great fictions of
the modern world, the Platonic Socrates, the artistic creation of
Plato, and the Christian Jesus, the artistic creation of his disciples
:
When we look back at the spiritual history of Europe it may
become possible to say that its two supreme figures, the Martyr of
Philosophy and the Martyr of Religion, were both—however real
the two human persons out of which they were formed—the work
of man's imagination. For there on the one hand we see the most
accomplished of European thinkers, and on the other a little band of
barbarians, awkwardly using the same Greek language, working
with an unconscious skill which even transcends all that conscious
skill could have achieved, yet both bearing immortal witness to the
truth that the human soul only lives truly in art and can only be
ruled through art. So it is that in art lies the solution of the con-
flicts of philosophy. There we see Realism, or the discovery of
things, one with Idealism or the creation of things. Art is the
embodied harmony of their conflict.
The treatment of the art of religion in the Dance of Life is the
outgrowth of the idea expressed so long ago in The New Spirit, that
"there is a religion of science''
:
If science and mysticism are alike based on fundamental instincts
appearing spontaneously all over the world ; if, moreover, they nat-
urally tend to be embodied in the same individual, in such a way that
each impulse would seem to be dependent upon the other for its
full development ; then there can be no ground for accepting any
disharmony between them. The course of human evolution involves
a division of labour, a specialization of science and of mysticism
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along special lines and in separate individuals. But a fundamental
antagonism of the two, it becomes evident, is not to be thought of ;
it is unthinkable, even absurd. If at some period in the course of
civilization we seriously find that our science and our religion are
antagonistic, then there must be something wrong either with our
science or our religion. Perhaps not seldom there may be something
wrong with both. For if the natural impulses which normally work
best together are separated and specialized in different persons, we
may expect to find a concomitant state of atrophy and hypertrophy,
both alike morbid. The scientific person will become atrophied on
the mystical side, the mystical person will become atrophied on the
scientific side. Each will become morbidly hypertrophied on his
own side. But the assumption that, because there is a lack of har-
mony between opposing pathological states there must also be a sim-
ilar lack of harmony in the normal states, is unreasonable.
It is important to observe that although Ellis subserves these
related impulses to the one profound impulse of art, he does not
confuse them. He does not say that art is science, that science is
religion, he is careful to preserve their distinct natures; he says
merely, science is of the nature of art, religion is of the nature of
art ; therefore there can be, for instance, an art of religion.
It is a harmony that rests on the faith that they are eternally
separate, however close, however intimately co-operative. When
the mystic professes that, as such, he has knowledge of the same
order as the man of science, or when the scientist claims that, as such
he has emotion which is like that of the man of religion, each of
them deceives himself. . . . Science, by itself, good or bad, can
never be religion, any more than religion by itself can ever be sci-
ence, or even philosophy.
The question of the difference between the aesthetic action of
living as an art and the passive contemplation implied in the science
of aesthetics, has not yet been resolved
:
On the background of general aesthetic judgment we have to
concentrate on the forces of creative artistic activity, whose work it
is painfully to mould the clay of moral action, and to forge its iron,
long before the aesthetic criterion can be applied to the final product.
The artist's work in life is full of struggle and toil; it is only the
spectator of morals who can assume the calm aesthetic attitude.
Shaftesbury, indeed, evidently recognized this, but it was not enough
to say, as he said, that we may prepare ourselves for moral action
by the study of literature. One may be willing to regard life as an
art, and yet be of the opinion that it is as unsatisfactory to learn
the art of living in literature as to learn, let us say, the art of music
in architecture.
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For all art is, primarily, not a contemplation but a doing, a cre-
ative action, and morality is so pre-eminently.
Aestheticism, as found in the influence of Pater, Ellis weighed
for his purpose years ago, and found it incomplete, inadequate to
our life today. He found it admirable for what it was, and it is
doubtless true that he was inspired to his vigorous creative aesthetic
ideal by the beauty of the contemplative aesthetic valuation of the
world in Marius the Epicurean, but of a "refined development of
the passive sensory sides of the human organism with correspond-
ing atrophy of the motor sides," he said, in The Neiv Spirit, that "it
is clearly impossible to go any farther on that road."
The material is pretty well before us, and at least we are cer-
tain of some of the things that this "art" of the "art of life" is not.
But to some people it is no more possible to think of art without
thinking of genius than to think of smoke without fire. And the
place of genius in this art Qf governing our everyday life has not
yet been considered.
"All genius must work without rest, it cannot do otherwise ; only
the most happily constituted genius works without haste." Haste,
certainly, and a disproportionate attention to one aspect of life, is
not the method of art that Ellis has in mind for the average man to
whom he advises the governing of life by the method of art. His
concern, as stated earlier in this paper, is with the harmonious
arrangement of the life we are forced to live in a complex world
with the vital needs and capabilities of the average human organism.
"There is room, after all, for the sturdy bourgeois laborer who, at
the end of a hard life in the service of truth, sits down to enjoy
his brown beer and Haydn's quartettes, and to repeat his homely
confession of faith in the world as he sees it."
Well, then, if every man is not to become a genius, and yet is
to be a good artist in an art that gives range to the profound basic
instincts rooted in his being, just what is the nature of this "art"?
If genius is not to be automatically infused in the requisite amounts,
what is there to distinguish this "art" from a craft? Where is the
"art" element contained ? And if this art is to be a practical vision
of the world as beauty, where does beauty as the beauty of art enter
in ? These are the questions which make necessary a careful analy-
sis of the evolution of the word "art" as used in Ellis.
First of all, is this art of living merely an elaborated revival of
the crafts ideal so often sighed for?
348 THE OPEX COURT
The diffused aesthetic sense is correlated with a diffused artistic
instinct, based on craftsmanship. . . . Wilham Morris was a pioneer
in assertinf^ this association. As a distinguished English writer,
Mr. Charles Marriott, the novelist and critic, clearly puts the mod-
ern doctrine, "'the first step is to absorb, or reabsorb, the 'artist'
into the craftsman. . . . (Jnce agreed that the same aesthetic con-
siderations which apply to painting a picture apply, though in a dif-
ferent degree, to painting a door, and you have emancipated labor
without any prejudice to the highest art. ... A good surface of
paint on a door is as truly an emotional or aesthetic consideration
as 'significant form,' indeed, it is 'significant form'." Professor
Santayana has spoken in the same sense: "In a thoroughly human-
ized society everything— clothes, speech, manners, government—is
a work of art." It is, indeed, the general tendency today and is
traceable in Croce's later writings.
The danger is immediately evident : far from effecting a recon-
ciliation in the time-old divorce between daily life and art, the new
ideal vision of life is apt to be even farther removed from harmony
with the scheme of life as we are today obliged to live it, than is
the heaven of art itself. Ellis, who repeats at the very outset the
Heraclitean saying that no man bathes twice in the same stream,
ought of all people best to realize that to prescribe craftsmanship
to us of today is like telling us to cool our faces in last winter's
snow. But it has been, as we observed, just on this point of the
autonomy of art that his structure has once or twice had a suspicious
look, as we observed in considering his subjection of certain beauties
to "higher ends." The dance indeed, though composed of the very
stuff of life, is an art because it is not purposive, and is an end in
itself ; now if Ellis' dance of life can be shown to be free, and an
end in itself, then indeed this way of life is an art, but it is upon
the proving of this that that art, as an art, depends.
The idea of the uses of the fictional enters again. Do not hold
too tenaciously to familiar axioms, for:
Your business is to invent a truth which shall harmoniously sat-
isfy the need of your nature and aid your efificiency in practical life.
There is no transcendent objective truth; each one of us is an artist
erecting his own truth from the phenomena presented to him, but
if in that creation he allows any alien emotional or practical consid-
eration to influence him he is a bad artist, and his work is wrought
for destruction.
This is essentially of the nature of art. in that one should seek
form in one's thought but never formula, being content that a resem-
bling unlikeness to the world that has the virtue of harmonizing
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with one's nature is a satisfactory truth. The objection is that this
is essentially that which genius accomplishes in the achievement of
art, and that to set it down unqualifiedly as a working principle calls
for the artist's ability to an extent hardly to be expected of every-
one. Thus, in this respect life is, as an ideal, an art. In other
words, it resolves itself pretty much into this: For the artist in liv-
ing, life is an art. More general than that one cannot, with assur-
ance, be.
As a general principle, outside of the accidents of genius, one
cannot give to this art, with assurance, a quality of beauty befitting
a fine art, because upon the artist depends the beauty of his work
of art. One can simply say that the method and spirit of art are as
beautifully adapted to living as to any of the "special arts." and that
is certainly to be conceded. One can say that by the methods of
art an art of life may be achieved, but it is like saying that by the
handling of a violin bow beautiful music may be produced. In the
hands of an artist of nature the art of life of which Ellis speaks
might well be one of the finest arts. But as for the "art" to which
we have tried applying, as general principles, the qualities of art as
it means beatitude to man, that "art" has been used all along in the
sense, whether willingly or not, in which all practice is art. The
method and spirit of art he has shown to be amenable to the practice
of life ; for the result one can say only that it would vary from
unsuccessful attempts at a paradoxical ascetic-hedonism to a life
beautifully proportioned and wrought as a flower. The latter, when
the methods prescribed are put into practice by another Leonardo.
Ellis has shown that art as finely selective "doing" is the most
fundamental instinct of man's nature. On this may be raised an
aesthetics of hope. "Meanwhile Art is elusive as ever, mocking us
from afar with that fine beauty which makes attempts to catch hei"
with words at once so ridiculously futile and so unceasingly attrac-
tive.
The problem of fine living except as an all-too-rare bloom on the
dull level path of human life is much the same for Ellis as it was
fifty years ago; it has simply become increasingly elaborate under
careful thought. Of the path of that achievement from The New
Spirit to The Dance of Life his own words spoken of the two poles
of Nietzsche's endeavor, are fair and sufficient: "It would be foolish
to regard either of the termini as the last outpost of wisdom. But
in the passage between these two points many excellent things are
said by the way."
